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SURVIVING PREEMPTION IN A WORLD OF 
COMPREHENSIVE REGULATIONS 
Kyle Anne Piasecki* 
The Clean Air Act imposes a federal regulatory regime on a number of sources 
of air pollution. It does not, however, provide a ready means of relief to 
individuals harmed by air polluters. Nevertheless, many courts have held that 
the Clean Air Act preempts state common law tort claims that do provide a 
means to such relief. The disparate benefits of the Clean Air Act and common 
law tort claims may indicate different purposes and make court-imposed 
preemption of common law tort claims improper. This Comment argues that 
the Savings Clause in the Clean Air Act and in parallel state statutes should be 
clarified so as to explicitly preserve an injured party’s ability to seek relief 
through state common law. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Earth’s climate is changing in large part because of the release 
of airborne pollutants. These pollutants may also cause serious damage 
to private property. And yet, the federal government’s major legislation 
for regulating air emissions, the Clean Air Act (CAA), provides no 
opportunity for individuals harmed by air pollution to seek 
compensatory damages if the defendant followed CAA regulations.1 
This gap in remedies can be filled through common law tort claims. 
However, whether the CAA or its companion state statutes preempt state 
common law remains an unresolved question. Part I of this Comment 
will discuss basic preemption doctrine and federal courts’ application of 
the doctrine to state common law claims regarding air quality. Part II 
lays out the more difficult burden state courts have in deciding the 
potentially preemptive effect of both the CAA and their own state 
companion statutes. While the different purposes of state common law 
and the CAA or its companion statutes should weigh against preemption, 
some state courts have decided otherwise. Part III suggests possible 
solutions that would preserve individual rights secured by common law 
claims by (1) embedding an individual right to damages within the CAA 
                                                      
*   J.D. Candidate, May 2016, University of Michigan Law School. 
1.    See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a), (e) (2006) (providing the right to citizen suit enforcement but no right 
to compensatory damages except through common law). 
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or state companion statute or (2) clarifying the inconsistently applied 
savings clause in the CAA. 
I. FEDERAL PREEMPTION AND AIR QUALITY 
A. Federal Preemption in General 
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution makes clear 
that, where the federal government legislates within its enumerated 
powers, these laws reign “supreme” and therefore preempt the states’ 
laws.2 This preemption prevents state laws from interfering with an 
agency’s complex regulatory scheme.3 When conducting a preemption 
analysis, “particularly in [cases] in which Congress has legislated . . . in 
a field which the States have traditionally occupied,” a court will apply a 
presumption that the “historic police powers of the States were not to be 
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest 
purpose of Congress.”4 The clarity of Congress’s intent will depend on 
whether the preemption was express or implied. Express preemption 
occurs when Congress explicitly states that the law is preempted.5 
Implied preemption takes two forms. The first, “field preemption,” 
occurs when federal regulations occupy a field of law almost completely 
or when the federal government’s interest in the area of law is so 
compelling that state action is not welcome.6 The second form, “conflict 
preemption,” occurs when it is either impossible or difficult to comply 
with both state and federal law simultaneously.7 
Congress can irrefutably avoid the preemption of state law by 
including a “savings clause” in an act.8 These savings clauses explicitly 
limit the scope of the statute’s preemptive force by stating that the 
federal statute shall not be construed to preempt some particular 
category of law.9 However, even in areas already receiving a 
presumption against preemption (due to traditional state powers), courts 
have generally “decline[d] to give broad effect to saving clauses where 
                                                      
 2.  U.S. CONST. ART. VI. 
 3.  J.J. England, Saving Preemption in the Clean Air Act: Climate Change, State Common 
Law, and Plaintiffs Without A Remedy, 43 ENVTL. L. 701, 724-25 (2013). 
 4.  Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009) (internal citations omitted). 
 5.  England, supra note 3, at 724. 
 6.  Id. at 724; see, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2502 (2012). 
 7.  England, supra note 3, at 724–25; Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2503. 
 8.  Scott Gallisdorfer, Clean Air Act Preemption of State Common Law: Greenhouse Gas 
Nuisance Claims After AEP v. Connecticut, 99 VA. L. REV. 131, 141 (2013). 
 9.  Id. 
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doing so would upset the careful regulatory scheme established by 
federal law.”10 
B. Preemption of State Common Law Under the CAA 
The CAA establishes comprehensive federal air quality standards 
and regulates certain hazardous air pollutants emitted from stationary 
sources and mobile sources, including motor vehicles and aircrafts.11 
The responsibility of achieving these standards is delegated to the states 
if they devise a strategy for attainment called a State Implementation 
Plan (SIP).12 If the SIP is successful, states retain considerable power to 
enforce stricter emission standards by broadening the scope of regulated 
stationary sources (by including sources not regulated by the CAA, for 
example) and setting stricter standards for stationary sources that are 
covered by the CAA.13 In other words, states act as final implementers 
of these statutes. This delegation of responsibility to state authority is 
known as “cooperative federalism.”14 
The CAA does include an express preemption clause regarding 
mobile sources: “[n]o State or any political subdivision thereof shall 
adopt or attempt to enforce any standard relating to the control of 
emissions from new motor vehicles . . . .”15 This includes the preemption 
of tort claims under state common law.16 The Act does not include an 
express preemption clause covering stationary sources, so, if the CAA 
preempts state common law relating to stationary sources of air 
pollution, it must be through one of the forms of implied preemption. 
Additionally, the CAA includes a savings clause that provides: 
“[n]othing in this [CAA citizen suit provision] shall restrict any right 
which any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute or 
common law to seek enforcement of any emission standard or limitation 
or to seek any other relief.”17 This general rule, however, is limited by an 
exception providing that states “may not adopt or enforce any emission 
standard or limitation which is less stringent” than that required under 
CAA §§ 111 and 112 or the state’s SIP.18 
                                                      
 10.  Id. at 141–42. 
 11.  See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7521–7590 (2012) 
 12.  England, supra note 3, at 707. 
 13.  See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a) (2012); 42 U.S.C.A. § 7410(a)(5)(A)(i) (2012). 
 14.  England, supra note 3, at 725. 
 15.  42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2006). 
 16.  England, supra note 3, at 733. 
 17.  42 U.S.C.A. § 7604 (West 2006). 
 18.  42 U.S.C. § 7416 (2012) [hereinafter “States’ Rights Savings Clause”]. 
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The CAA does not prevent states from adopting more stringent 
standards than those prescribed by the Act itself.19 The CAA’s States’ 
Rights Savings Clause reserves for states the right to “adopt or enforce 
(1) any standard or limitation respecting emissions of air pollutants or 
(2) any requirement respecting control or abatement of air 
pollution . . . .”20 Because the CAA only dictates a floor for its 
quantitative emissions standard, state common law itself could impose a 
stricter standard, just as a state’s companion statute might. Reaching a 
stricter standard in these ways still fulfills the state’s obligations with the 
lower CAA standard.21 Therefore, source-state common law does not 
appear to pose an obstacle to the CAA regime and therefore should not 
fall under conflict preemption. 
1. Recent CAA Cases 
To determine whether field preemption doctrine requires the CAA to 
preempt source-state common law, the Third Circuit in Bell v. Cheswick 
compared the CAA to the Clean Water Act (CWA).22 In doing so they 
turned to International Paper Co. v. Ouellette,23 where the Supreme 
Court interpreted the CWA’s citizen suit savings clause and analyzed its 
preemptive effects on common law.24 Finding the CAA to be 
substantially similar to the CWA and the citizen suit savings clauses to 
be nearly identical, the Third Circuit regarded Ouellette as a guide for 
determining the preemptive power of the CAA.25 In Ouellette, the CWA 
did not preempt source-state common law claims under field preemption 
doctrine.26 The Third Circuit found both the CWA and the CAA to be 
comprehensive in their fields with citizen suit savings clauses that 
protect individuals seeking to invoke state common law.27 
In contrast, the Fourth Circuit—three years before Bell, in North 
Carolina v. Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)28—voiced concerns that 
                                                      
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 734 F.3d 188, 194–97 (3d Cir. 2013); 33 U.S.C.A. § 
1365(e). 
 23.  Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 482, 497–99 (1987). 
 24.  Id. at 194–95; Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 482, 497–99. 
 25.  Bell, 734 F.3d at 195. 
 26.  Id. at 194–95 (reading the CWA and its Savings Clause to allow states to adopt more 
stringent standards through state statutes and state common law). 
 27.  Id. at 196–97. 
 28.  North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 615 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2010). 
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state tort law could undermine the CAA’s regulatory regime.29 North 
Carolina brought a nuisance suit against the TVA for its emissions that 
allegedly harmed North Carolina’s air quality.30 The Fourth Circuit did 
not cite Ouellette for its focus on the problems created by allowing 
parties from each affected state to bring their state’s common law claims 
against one polluter. The court instead read the Ouellette case as a 
warning against all common law nuisance actions for fear that they 
would interfere with the operation of federal statutes.31 Consequently, 
the Fourth Circuit stated that Ouellette intended to preempt nearly all 
common law claims.32 
In American Electric Power Company v. Connecticut (American 
Electric),33 which was decided after TVA, the Supreme Court held that 
the CAA fully displaced federal common law because the relief sought 
through federal common law—limits on carbon dioxide emissions—
could also be achieved through the CAA’s opportunity for the public to 
petition for rulemaking.34 The Court saw no reason for parallel 
rulemaking.35 While the Court eliminated one avenue of relief by 
preempting federal common law, it notably declined to decide whether 
the CAA also preempts state common law claims.36 
Following American Electric, a federal district court in Comer v. 
Murphy Oil USA37 found state common law nuisance claims to be 
preempted by the CAA because these claims called for juries to decide 
whether emissions were reasonable.38 The court held that the CAA 
required this decision to be made by the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA).39 
In contrast, the Third Circuit in Bell, discussed above, concluded 
that Ouellette found that cooperative federalism would allow states to set 
more stringent standards through tort law.40 The Bell case involved 
particulates released from a generating station that settled in nearby 
neighborhoods, making the plaintiffs feel like “prisoners in their [own] 
                                                      
 29.  See id. at 303. 
 30.  Id. at 296–97. 
 31.  Id. at 303. 
 32.  See id. 
 33.  Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011). 
 34.  Id. at 2532–33, 2538. 
 35.  Id. at 2532. 
 36.  Id. at 2540. 
 37.  Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 2d 849 (S.D. Miss. 2012). 
 38.  Id. at 865. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 734 F.3d 188, 197–98 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Int’l 
Paper Co., supra note 23, at 498–99). 
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homes.”41 Bell set a rule in the Third Circuit that the CAA does not 
preempt state common law claims because the source state may impose 
a stricter standard through tort actions.42 This holding could be a 
bellwether for other circuits. 
C. The Importance of State Common Law 
Although an in-depth discussion of the value of tort law in 
environmental policy is beyond the scope of this Comment, a brief 
overview will frame the discussion to follow. 
The circumstances that led to the suit in Bell demonstrate the need 
for tort law in this field. Without a claim in tort, the plaintiffs could not 
seek redress for their property damage because the defendant abided by 
CAA regulations.43 In other words, tort law preserves crucial remedies 
for plaintiffs who are not afforded protection by the CAA. Although the 
Third Circuit in Bell recognized this gap in compensation, the United 
States District Court (in the antecedent case) failed to appreciate these 
shortcomings.44 The district court noted that the CAA provides plaintiffs 
with various sources of redress to enforce emission standards.45 First, the 
CAA allows citizen suits against those who violate regulations issued by 
the EPA or the state.46 Second, the EPA “retains the power to inspect 
and monitor regulated sources, to impose administrative penalties for 
noncompliance, and to commence civil actions against polluters in 
federal court,” but “may delegate implementation and enforcement 
authority to the States.”47 Plaintiffs, in their reply, explained that they 
were seeking money damages, and not enforcement of pre-existing 
standards.48 The citizen suit provision within the CAA is, however, not 
structured to provide private individuals with money damages.49 Instead, 
it may allow for civil penalties to be paid to the federal treasury, but 
compensatory damages can, by design, only be provided through state 
law.50 
                                                      
 41.  Id. at 192. 
 42.  Id. at 197–98. 
 43.  Id. at 191–92. 
 44.  Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 903 F. Supp. 2d 314, 322–23 (W.D. Pa. 2012). 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. at 323. 
 47.  Id. at 322–23 (quoting Am. Elec. Power Co., supra note 33, at 2538). 
 48.  Id. at 323 (quoting Am. Elec. Power Co., supra note 33, at 2538). 
 49.  42 U.S.C. § 7604(a), (e) (2006). 
 50.  Samantha Caravello, Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 465, 
475 (2014). 
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Apart from damages, the common law also offers other benefits, 
such as exposing gaps in the regulatory scheme, and many suits of this 
kind can spur other government branches to fix these problems.51 
II. STATE STATUTES AND EXTRA HURDLES TO STATE COURT RELIEF 
A. Continuing Relevance of a Federal Preemption Defense in State Tort 
Actions 
Although Bell could be viewed as a decisive case, a district court 
case in the Fifth Circuit, Cerny v. Marathon Oil Corporation,52 strained 
to preserve the defendant’s ability to raise a preemption defense in state 
court: “the Court’s holding regarding complete preemption has no 
preclusive effect on the state court’s consideration of the merits of a 
substantive preemption defense.”53 This suggests that state common law 
may be preempted by the CAA in state court, even though it may not be 
preempted in federal court. Additionally, state courts may find state 
common law to be preempted by their own companion statutes.54 
Though claims of state statutory preemption of state common law tort 
claims have not been widely litigated in state courts, this type of 
preemption defense seems likely in response to Bell. This is especially 
true when considering that the CAA gives states authority to regulate 
emissions more strictly and across a wider scope than the federal 
standards.55 Because the doctrine of field preemption is only invoked 
when federal regulations occupy a field of law almost completely, the 
more comprehensive environmental regulatory plans are, the more likely 
they will fully occupy the field and preempt state common law. This 
idea is reflected in a brief by amicus curiae supporting defendant GenOn 
Power in Bell. The brief states, “the Clean Air Act ‘is sufficiently 
comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no 
room for supplementary state regulation.’ This is especially true where 
the states are involved in implementing, maintaining, and enforcing the 
Act.”56 The brief goes on to discuss the states’ role in deciding the limits 
                                                      
 51.  Id. at 476. 
 52.  Cerny v. Marathon Oil Corp., No. CIV.A. SA-13-CA-562, 2013 WL 5560483 (W.D. Tex. 
Oct. 7, 2013). 
 53.  Id. at 8. 
 54.  Freeman v. Grain Processing Corp., 848 N.W.2d 58, 70 (Iowa 2014). 
 55.  See 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (2012). 
 56.  Brief for DRI—The Voice of the Defense Bar as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents 
at 3–4, Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 437 F.3d 188 (3d Cir. 2013) (No. 13-1013), quoting 
Hillsborough Cty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985). 
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and types of emissions that each permit holder is allowed to discharge.57 
Despite the states’ ability to set potentially more stringent standards, 
state courts should still not find these state regulations to preempt state 
common law. 
B. State Statutes Preempting State Common Law 
In determining whether a state statute preempts state common law, 
the state court would conduct an analysis similar to the one used to 
decide preemption under a federal statute. The preemption analysis starts 
with the principle that statutes that abrogate the common law must be 
strictly construed.58 Courts should look for a legislature’s explicit intent 
to preempt common law. Without an explicit intent, the court should 
then consider whether the “statute’s timing, structure and purpose, or 
nonspecific statutory language . . . reveals a clear, but implicit, 
preemptive intent.”59 
The timing test examines whether the state enacted a statutory 
regime before the common law tort arose, finding preemption only 
where the common law tort arose after the enactment.60 While the 
enactment date of common law torts varies from claim-to-claim and 
state-to-state, tort claims challenging environmental pollution generally 
trace back to the seventeenth century.61 American case law dating back 
to the nineteenth century demonstrates how common law causes of 
action to address pollution have been part of historic state police 
powers.62 Clearly, under a timing-test analysis, state statutes regulating 
emissions standards would not preempt state common law tort claims. 
Under the field preemption test, legislative intent to preempt state 
common law is reasonably inferred based on a sufficiently 
comprehensive statutory regime.63 A comprehensive regime effectively 
creates a presumption that the statute supplants the common law. The 
                                                      
 57.  Id. at 5, quoting Hillsborough Cty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 
(1985). 
 58.  See Van Waters & Rogers, Inc. v. Keelan, 840 P.2d 1070, 1076 (Colo. 1992) (en banc) 
(“[S]tatutes in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed, so that if the legislature 
wishes to abrogate rights that would otherwise be available under the common law, it must manifest 
its intent either expressly or by clear implication.”). 
 59.  Summit Water Distribution Co. v. Mountain Reg’l Water Special Serv. Dist., 2005 UT 
App 66, 108 P.3d 119, 122 (internal citations omitted). 
 60.  Jarod S. Gonzalez, State Antidiscrimination Statutes and Implied Preemption of Common 
Law Torts: Valuing the Common Law, 59 S.C. L. REV. 115, 131 (2007). 
 61.  Freeman v. Grain Processing Corp., 848 N.W.2d 58, 66 (Iowa 2014). 
 62.  See id. 
 63.  Gonzalez, supra note 60, at 131–32. 
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breadth of statutory coverage and the available remedies determine 
whether the statute is sufficiently comprehensive to invoke field 
preemption.64 For example, several courts have held that a state 
antidiscrimination statute is insufficiently comprehensive to impliedly 
preempt the common law when the remedy under the statute does not 
provide an individual remedy to plaintiffs.65  These courts failed to 
secure compensatory and punitive damages for injured individuals. As 
discussed above, CAA violations may result in violators paying civil 
money penalties to the government, but harmed individuals—similar to 
the antidiscrimination statute—are left without any monetary damages 
remedy.66 The common law, however, provides compensatory and 
punitive damages for harmed property owners.67 Because state 
companion statutes provide a limited scope of remedies,68 it would be 
reasonable to conclude that such state emission standard laws do not 
create a regulatory regime so comprehensive that the court should find 
implied legislative intent to completely occupy the field and supplant 
state common law tort claims. 
A third way to deduce implied preemption is to determine whether 
the conduct required to bring a state common law tort claim is the same 
conduct that is necessary to prove a violation of a state statute.69 
Namely, the statute impliedly preempts the common law if it regulates 
the same conduct.70 Comparing environmental regulation and nuisance 
law, “the differences in the statutory and common law regimes are 
demonstrated by what must be shown to establish a violation.”71 The 
presence of a nuisance may or may not accompany a violation of a 
companion statute.72 In other words, one may be in compliance with 
state statutory regulations, but still be liable for a common law tort claim 
of nuisance, negligence, or trespass. 
Lastly, the independence test provides another means to analyze 
possible preemption of state common law. This test considers whether 
the harm that constitutes the common law tort claim matches the injury 
                                                      
 64.  Id. at 132. 
 65.  See id. 
 66.  See supra Part I.C. 
 67.  See Freeman, 848 N.W.2d at 69. 
 68.  See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 455B.111 (West 2013) (stating that a person may bring 
action against a defendant if that defendant has violated an emission standard set in chapter 455B—
Iowa’s companion statute). 
 69.  Gonzalez, supra note 60, at 132. 
 70.  Id. at 132. 
 71.  Freeman supra note 54, at 70. 
 72.  Id. 
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the state statute is designed to prevent.73 In other words, is the statute 
designed to address this injury? Is fixing this problem the statute’s 
purpose? If it is, the state statute is more likely to preempt the common 
law claim.74 Because the relevant state statutes are designed to 
implement the CAA, the purposes of the federal statute are relevant in 
analyzing the purposes of the state statutes. Among other purposes, the 
CAA is written to “protect and enhance the quality of the Nation’s air 
resources so as to promote the public health and welfare and the 
productive capacity of its population.”75 State common law tort claims 
range in their targeted objectives. Focusing on a typical allegation, e.g., 
nuisance, it is obvious that the common law cause of action seeks to 
rectify problems beyond public health and welfare.76 “‘A public 
nuisance is an unreasonable interference with a right common to the 
general public.’ An interference is unreasonable if the conduct 
significantly interferes with the public health, safety, peace, comfort, or 
convenience . . . or has a permanent, long-lasting effect on a public 
right.”77 In addition, nuisance suits aid those who are disproportionately 
affected by pollution,78 rather than the general population, which is the 
target of CAA statutes. The purposes and targeted populations of the 
CAA and of common law nuisance claims appear distinct. 
Consequently, under the independence test, state emission statutes do 
not seem to impliedly preempt state common law tort claims.79 
                                                      
 73.  Gonzalez, supra note 60, at 133–34. 
 74.  See id. at 133. 
 75.  42 U.S.C.A. § 7401 (2006). 
 76.  See Freeman v. Grain Processing Corp., 848 N.W.2d 58, 63 (Iowa 2014) (bringing 
nuisance, trespass, and negligence claims and alleging that the full use and enjoyment of the 
plaintiffs’ property was diminished); Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 734 F.3d 188, 192 (3d 
Cir. 2013) (complaining of noxious odors and “black dust/film . . . or white powder” which requires 
constant cleaning); Cerny v. Marathon Oil Corp., No. CIV.A. SA-13-CA-562, 2013 WL 5560483, 
at 1 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 7, 2013) (alleging that the plaintiffs have been harmed by noxious chemicals). 
 77.  Adam D.K. Abelkop, Tort Law As an Environmental Policy Instrument, 92 Or. L. Rev. 
381, 395 (2013) (internal citations omitted). 
 78.  Randall S. Abate, Public Nuisance Suits for the Climate Justice Movement: The Right 
Thing and the Right Time, 85 Wash. L. Rev. 197, 201 (2010). 
 79.  Merrick v. Diageo Americas Supply, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 3d 865, 875 (W.D. Ky. 2014), citing  
Merrick. v. Brown-Forman Corp., No. 12-CI-3382 (Jefferson Cir. Ct., Div. 9, July 30, 2013) at 4. It 
should be noted that states might have additional purposes when implementing statutes that go 
beyond the floor set by the CAA. Therefore, a state court analyzing the preemptive effect of a state 
statute that more strictly regulates emissions would need to examine the possible additional 
purposes of the individual state statute and compare how those purposes relate to the state common 
law regime. Such an analysis would require an individualized, state-by-state assessment. 
Unfortunately, such a review is beyond the scope of this Comment.  It should also be noted that the 
Appeals Court of Kentucky reversed the state court decision in Merrick v. Brown-Forman Corp., 
No. 2013-CA-002048-MR, 2014 Ky. App. LEXIS 178, at *9-10 (Ky. Ct. App.).  Though this is the 
only example in which a state court has held state common law to be preempted by the CAA, it is 
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C. Some State Courts Have Found State Common Law Federally 
Preempted 
The Jefferson Circuit Court, a state trial court in Kentucky, found 
that the CAA preempted the state’s common law.80 It did so despite the 
fact that the common law in question predates the CAA, preserves 
different remedies, is triggered by different conduct, and is aimed at a 
disproportionately affected population. The court acknowledged the 
reasoning of the Third Circuit in Bell, but chose to follow the reasoning 
and holding of the Fourth Circuit in TVA.81 The Jefferson Circuit Court 
noted that the application of common law tort could undermine the 
regulatory structure established by the state under the CAA.82 However, 
another Kentucky lower court found that the CAA and state statutes do 
not preempt state common law tort claims.83 
The Iowa Supreme Court also reached a different conclusion than 
the Jefferson Circuit Court.84 In Freeman v. Grain Processing 
Corporation, residents based their claims on common law nuisance, 
trespass, and negligence, while the defendant claimed that the Iowa 
companion statute to the CAA, Iowa Code chapter 455B, preempted 
these claims.85 The Iowa court found that the state’s common law 
purpose—redressing harm to an individuals’ enjoyment of their 
property—and the CAA’s purpose—upholding the public interest in 
controlling emissions—did not overlap.86 The court concluded that the 
Iowa legislature, therefore, did not provide a comprehensive scheme for 
nuisance-type disputes and the Iowa CAA companion statute did not 
preempt Iowa common law.87 This overturned the trial court’s holding 
that state nuisance laws were unpredictable enough to interfere with the 
state’s complex regulatory scheme. 
As mentioned above, state statutory preemption of state common 
law has not been widely litigated in state courts.88 If state statutory 
                                                      
important to discuss this possibility of preemption as state companion statutes can be stricter and 
broader—making them more likely to be preemptive—and because it is possible that these 
relatively recent cases are the first of many. 
 80.  Id. at 875. 
 81.  Id. at 875. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Mills v. Buffalo Trace Distillery, Inc., No. 12-CI-00743 (Franklin Cir. Ct., Div. 2, Aug. 
27, 2013) at 3. 
 84.  Freeman v. Grain Processing Corp., 848 N.W.2d 58, 70 (Iowa 2014). 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. at 88. 
 87.  Id. at 89. 
 88.  See supra Part II.A. 
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preemption arguments become more prevalent in courts,89 it will be 
necessary to explore the contours of states’ CAA companion statutes to 
determine whether each state’s emission regulations supplant its own 
state common law tort claims. To the extent that the CAA alone does not 
preempt a state common law claim, the state statutory analysis will take 
on increased importance.90 One such contour is the “no more stringent 
than” provisions in some state SIPs—which bars a state’s ability to 
impose standards above the minimum “floor” set by the CAA.91 For 
example, Pennsylvania’s Air Pollution and Control Act’s (APCA) 
companion regulations, 25 Pa. Code §§ 121–141, are also promulgated 
pursuant to the CAA. In other words, the standards set by the CAA and 
by the state are coextensive.92 In United States v. EME Homer City 
Generation, the federal district court found that the CAA and the APCA 
preempted state common law nuisance claims.93 In doing so, the court 
cited TVA: “where Congress has chosen to grant states an extensive role 
in the Clean Air Act’s regulatory regime through the SIP and permitting 
process, field and conflict preemption principles caution at a minimum 
against according states a wholly different role and allowing state 
nuisance law to contradict joint federal-state rules so meticulously 
drafted.”94 EME Homer was decided before Bell.95 Under EME Homer’s 
logic, if the CAA preempts state common law, then state statutes parallel 
to the CAA would also preempt state common law.  One may logically 
assume that the reverse would hold true as well; that is, a court could 
reasonably find that if state common law is not preempted by the CAA, 
then it should not be preempted by parallel state enforcement statutes.  
On the other hand, if a state emission statute were significantly more 
comprehensive, the question of preemption would prove more complex. 
These inconsistent preemption findings across federal circuits and in 
state courts must be addressed. 
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III. PROPOSED REFORM 
There are three relatively straightforward ways to resolve the 
preemption problems discussed above, establish the legitimacy of tort 
claims, and secure relief for injured individuals. Congress can amend the 
CAA (1) to create an individual cause of action under the CAA and an 
avenue for individual redress within the statutory scheme aimed directly 
at remedying the harms addressed by relevant state common law tort 
claims (e.g., nuisance, trespass, and negligence) or (2) to clarify the 
CAA’s citizen suit savings clause, making it explicit that state common 
law is not preempted by the CAA. Lastly, because the CAA does not 
limit state companion statutes from providing more expansive 
protection, state legislatures could also implement the first and second 
proposed reforms by amending their companion statutes. 
A. Creating an Individual Cause of Action for Damages Under the CAA 
Either Congress, by amending the CAA itself, or individual state 
legislatures, by amending their CAA companion statutes, could simply 
and definitively answer the preemption question and secure an 
individual remedy for injured parties by creating an individual cause of 
action and damages within their respective statutes. This solution would 
cause the CAA to fully occupy the field of clean air regulation and 
clearly preempt state common law because the harms formerly remedied 
only by the common law could instead be remedied under the CAA. 
This solution should involve an avenue for individual redress within the 
CAA. Pursuant to this amendment, a comprehensive system would be 
implemented to handle all possible nuisance grievances. This option has 
certain benefits. For example, a committee, or some deciding body with 
authority that has an in-depth familiarity with the regulatory framework 
of the CAA, could propose solutions that serve disproportionately 
harmed individuals, while avoiding interference with the complex CAA 
scheme. Creating an entire grievance regime would, however, be very 
costly because it would require resources to create and enforce federal 
statutes aimed at the same harms as state common law. And, considering 
the idiosyncrasies of many nuisance, trespass, and negligence cases, 
designing and implementing a streamlined, uniform process for 
addressing every case could be very challenging. Considering the CAA’s 
reliance on cooperative federalism, a more feasible solution in the spirit 
of the Act would be to allow the states to manage individual relief 
mechanisms—either through their own grievance regimes or the existing 
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state common law. 
B. Amending the CAA’s Citizen Suit Savings Clause 
The second main approach to addressing the problem of state and 
federal preemption of common law tort claims is to clarify the citizen 
suit savings clause in the CAA to make it explicit that state common law 
is not preempted by the CAA. This could be accomplished by 
eliminating the words “this section” from the CAA’s citizen suit savings 
clause96 to avoid the false impression of a limited reach. The citizen suit 
savings clause currently states: “nothing in this section shall restrict any 
right which any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute 
or common law to seek enforcement of any emission standard or 
limitation or to seek any other relief.”97 State citizen suit savings clauses 
may contain similar language. For example, the citizen suit savings 
clause in Iowa Code § 455B.111(5) provides, “this section does not 
restrict any right under statutory or common law of a person or class of 
person to seek enforcement of provisions of this chapter.”98 Based on 
precedent, defendants may argue that this language saves the common 
law only for that particular section.99 In City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, the 
court held that the language of the citizen suit savings clause “cannot be 
read to mean that the Act as a whole does not supplant formerly 
available federal common law actions but only that the particular section 
authorizing citizen suits does not do so.”100 Without the words this 
section, defendants would have difficulty applying a field preemption 
argument by arguing that the citizen suit savings clause in the CAA does 
not preserve a plaintiff’s state common law claim. 
In addition to removing any possible limiting language, the citizen 
suit savings clause should also clearly state that state common law is not 
preempted. A comparable example is the National Traffic and Motor 
Vehicle Safety Act, which includes a citizen suit savings clause that 
permits any state common law action.101 With this level of clarity, courts 
more easily decipher the legislature’s intentions. This ease is emphasized 
in one judge’s interpretation of the Motor Vehicle Safety Act: “It does 
not take a genius to figure out that the preemption clause tells states that 
                                                      
 96.  See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a) (2012). 
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they cannot have any nonidentical laws in any area which is governed by 
federal regulations, and for those areas in which there are no regulations, 
the states can still apply their common law.”102 Under this reasoning, 
individuals should still be able to apply state common law for issues 
such as nuisance and trespassing that are not covered by the federal 
regulations. 
If states choose to include a citizen suit savings clause in their 
companion statutes, they should model it after the proposed amended 
CAA provision to avoid inconsistency between state and federal parallel 
statutes—inconsistencies such as state statutes preempting state common 
law while matching federal statutes would not preempt state common 
law. This latter solution of clarifying the language in the CAA’s citizen 
suit savings clause would likely be a relatively easier means of resolving 
the preemption question favorably because it would merely secure the 
continuation of common law enforcement. 
C. Likely Criticism 
Businesses may criticize these legislative changes. As voiced in 
TVA, companies believe that allowing state common law claims will 
create concerns of business operability.103 Companies may fear 
becoming burdened with unpredictable layers of regulation as 
individuals demand standards that differ from federal and state-regulated 
emission levels, arguably upsetting the comprehensive nature of the 
regime.104 The court in Ouelette addressed this concern in its holding 
with respect to the CWA: 
[T]he restriction of suits to those brought under source-state 
nuisance law prevents a source from being subject to an 
indeterminate number of potential regulations. Although 
[source-state] nuisance law may impose separate standards and 
thus create some tension with the permit system, a source only is 
required to look to a single additional authority, whose rules 
should be relatively predictable. Moreover, States can be 
expected to take into account their own nuisance laws in setting 
permit requirements.105 
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In addition to multiple sources of scrutiny, companies may also 
worry that some judgments made while upholding state common law 
will lead to haphazard regulations unsupported by scientific findings.106 
As a former EPA attorney stated, “[t]ort liability, by its very nature, is 
not a product of technical experts working together and analyzing all of 
the factors that are enumerated in the environmental statutes.”107 
However, stricter emissions standards enacted by states are generally 
contemplated through state administrative law and scientifically driven 
standards. Further, a company’s compliance with applicable federal and 
state standards may be sufficient to show that a company’s emissions do 
not cause the level and type of injury necessary to give the plaintiff 
standing.108 Also, compliance with standards set by technical experts 
may demonstrate that a defendant acted reasonably and according to the 
standard of care. 
This understanding of compliance with regulations as a partial 
defense against common law tort claims may quell some companies’ 
fears that they will be held liable under divergent standards. In addition, 
the benefits served by allowing state common law claims—providing 
damages to harmed individuals, exposing gaps in the regulatory scheme, 
and motivating other branches to take steps to fill these gaps—may very 
well justify this added layer of inconvenience to companies. 
CONCLUSION 
Courts in different federal circuits and across different states are 
split in their application of federal preemption to state common law or 
companion state statute preemption to state common law. When courts 
have held the common law to be preempted, disproportionately harmed 
individuals are left without a remedy. In order to limit inconsistent 
holdings among courts and to further purposes beyond regulatory 
compliance—most notably securing relief for individuals’ injuries—
Congress should clarify the citizen suit savings clause in the CAA and, 
where applicable, state legislatures should similarly amend their state 
companion statutes. 
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